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According to Lynch, in his article “Ethnomethodology and History”, ethnomethodology 
offers a rich and valuable resource for studying the in situ production of history. In this 
article, we seek to lay out a research agenda for a ‘new business history’ that uses 
ethnomethodology to study “history-in-action”. Our aim is to show how an 
ethnomethodological history can be used to study the practical work of those tasked with 
‘making history’. We discuss the value of ethnomethodology for core business history 
methods, including the production and use of historical archives and written records, the 
treatment of witness memories, (auto)-biographies and testimonies, and the production of 
official versions of past events from diverse historical sources of evidence. We conclude by 
outlining the potential of ethnomethodology as a distinct paradigm of enquiry, which marks it 
out from conventional social scientific approaches to the relationship between empirical 
evidence and theory-building, by discussing (a) the value of studying the practical reasoning 
procedures used for generating and interpreting historical evidence, and (b) the value of 
opening up new forms of reflective practice for practitioners within the field.  
Keywords 




Business historians work with all kinds of empirical materials to piece together the history of 
an industry, business system or organization: company archives, publicly-available archives, 
records of interviews, financial records, journalistic coverage, biographies, legal documents, 
governmental records, popular business books or magazines of the time, and so on. Business 
history enables us to use knowledge of the past to inform and educate scholars, students, 
business practitioners, policy-makers and the wider public about what happened and why – 
and perhaps even shape the future through this knowledge of the past. Thanks to the 
scholarship within the field, we now have a rich understanding of major historical events and 
trends which have shaped the business world of today, such as the Wall Street Crash, the 
divorce between control and ownership in large corporations and bank-industry relations.
1
 
In recent years, the field has seen a series of calls for more engagement with the broader 
social science disciplines, including management and organization studies,
2
  in an attempt to 
persuade business historians to move beyond descriptive case studies or industry analyses 
that simply present a chronology of events. For de Jong, Higgins and Driel,
3
 business history 
needs to become a social science: wherein hypotheses can be tested, and rejected or refined, 
against objective empirical evidence. Business historians could, in their view, become like 
natural scientists, alike in methodology except for the fact that their ‘objects of analysis’ are 
not natural phenomena but social, cultural and political systems. Business history, for them, 
should not simply seek to describe what happened, but create general theories which can 
explain it, in the same way that physicists may use, say, the theory of gravity to predict the 
movement of objects in space.  
This plea to develop business history as a positive science certainly mirrors the trend towards 
viewing business and management studies more generally as a budding, if somewhat 
underdeveloped, “science” that gains its value and legitimacy from its ability to generate 
reliable, objective and generalizable theories and models to explain how businesses and 
business systems work.  A cursory glance over the leading international journals in business 
and management studies will also reveal the dominance of this positivistic logic in published 
research, with articles littered with variables, correlations and hypotheses. In this paper, we 
seek to lay out an alternative research agenda for the field of business history, grounded in 
ethnomethodology’s alternative theoretical vision. Ethnomethodology – as we will go on to 
outline – seeks nothing short of a ‘radical re-specification’ of the human sciences4, and offers 
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what we believe to be a rich source of theoretical insight for the development of new 
empirical and methodological perspectives in the field of business history. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first outline what ethnomethodology is, its relationship 
to mainstream social science and, following Lynch
5
, what an ethnomethodological approach 
to studying ‘history-in-action’ involves. Next, we outline how ethnomethodological history6 
differs from other approaches, drawing on illustrative excerpts from Lynch and Bogen’s 
seminal book The Spectacle of History. In the main body of the paper, we lay out three 
distinct but related research directions for developing an ethnomethodological business 
history: (1) studying how historical events are recorded, (2) studying how versions of the past 
are assembled and used for practical reasoning and decision-making, and (3) opportunities for 
new forms of reflective practice and reflective methodology. We conclude by situating this 
research agenda within the field of business history and its implications for research 
methodology and theory development. 
 
What is ethnomethodology? ... And what can it offer business history? 
The field of ethnomethodology was founded by the work of Harold Garfinkel, an American 
sociologist, in the 1960s. Ethnomethodology is the study of the practical methods through 
which members of a particular social group accomplish social organization and generate 
social order. The term can usefully be broken down:  
“ethno” = a social or cultural group, whether as small as a family business or as large 
as an entire nation-state; 
“methodology” = the methods or procedures that competent members of that group 
use to go about their social life (such as the ‘methods’ used to form an orderly queue); 
Ethnomethodology has been used to study a wide range of different social groups and 
settings, from classic early studies of coroners tasked with deciding the cause of death when 
presented with a dead body,
7
 case-workers in a welfare agency,
8
 to scientists at work in a 
laboratory.
9
 Any - and indeed all - social practices can be studied, not just complex, 
professional or ‘expert’ settings such as these. Even apparently simple everyday actions such 
as crossing the road or forming a queue rely on member’s use of ‘ethno-methods’ to make 
them happen and keep them ‘orderly’.10 
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Ethnomethodology stands apart from its ‘home’ discipline of sociology in that it seeks to 
provide an alternative to mainstream functionalist sociology, specifically its assumptions 
about the social structures, facts and variables that are presumed to create social order. This 
applies both to the so-called ‘macro’ social order of the ‘rules’, ‘norms’ and ‘values’ 
purported to emanate from institutions such as the State, the family, the education system and 
religion, which are understood to govern society writ-large, and the so-called ‘micro’ social 
order of, say, a small number of people forming an orderly queue. Ethnomethodology 
addresses the same ‘problem’ or ‘topic’ as sociology – how social order is generated or 
transformed – but ‘turns it on its head’. Rather than seeing people as ‘judgemental dopes’ or 
‘dupes’ who are ‘pushed and pulled’ by social facts – such as a social rule, norm, or value – it 
views social order as the on-going, artful and knowledgeable accomplishment of members.
11
 
Functionalist approaches start with the premise that social facts exist as “objective facts” that 
have the same epistemological status as the facts and laws that natural scientists work with, 
then use them as an explanatory resource to explain how society ‘functions’ – as per the 
hypotheses about causal mechanisms that explain history sought by de Jong, Higgins and 
Driel’s vision for business history. Ethnomethodologists, on the other hand, treat social facts 
as a topic of study. People are understood to employ their stock of social knowledge and 
reasoning procedures to produce the very ‘social facts’ that other sociological approaches 
treat as unproblematic.  
Lynch and Bogen set out the analytical programme for an ethnomethodological perspective 
on history as follows: 
“If one assumes that no objective or historical knowledge can ever be 
“unconstructed”, then to say that something held out to be a fact really is a social 
construction does not imply that the fact should be dismissed as an illusion or 
condemned as a product of political machinations ... We are more interested in the 
infrastructure of that construction, the practical methods through which the event was 
assembled, contested and stabilised.”12 
Two important notes are necessary here. First, this emphasis on the ‘knowledge-ability’ of 
actors must not be confused with claiming that members are always conscious of these ethno-
methods. In fact, a central project of ethnomethodology is to explicate and document the 
typically taken-for-granted ethno-methods used by members. Hence, many insights can be 
gained from revealing the often taken-for-granted and typically un-explicated methods 
through which histories are compiled from diverse sources of evidence. Second, this 
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emphasis on the ‘ongoing’ and ‘artful’ accomplishment of social organization does not mean 
that ‘anything goes’: that any version of history will be accepted or ratified by others. Quite 
the contrary, ethnomethodology is centrally concerned with the more or less institutionalised 
and systematically unequal opportunities and rights of different social actors to produce 
accounts and have them accepted by others.
13
 To paraphrase Mehan: while everyone presents 
their version of history as real, powerful people’s versions are real for everyone in their 
consequences.
14
   
 
Making Sense of Historical Events 
How do historians make sense of historical evidence? How does this process of ‘reading’ 
inform the historical accounts they produce? As Tosh points out, sensemaking is a 
fundamental component of history, as historians attempt to not only describe but also 
interpret the past
15
. Box 1 provides an illustration of the equivocality of the kinds of 
historical evidence (oral testimony and documents) in Lynch and Bogen’s analysis of the now 
infamous Iran-Contra affair of 1985-1987. 
 
--- Insert Box 1 here --- 
 
Taking Sides 
Several analytical avenues are opened up when historians examine evidence such as that 
provided in Box 1. The first is to ‘take sides’: to explicitly (or implicitly) accept one party’s 
version and ‘ratify’ it as the correct version, to be written into the historian’s version of 
events. This is exactly what most histories of the Iran-Contra affair have done: North is 
depicted as either a calculating and manipulative liar, or an American hero and loyal servant 
of the state, or a combination thereof.
16
 Cox follows this line of reasoning in his analysis of 
the financial scandal that engulfed the Royal Mail Shipping Group in the 1920s and the price 
fixing and market manipulation involved in the tin and pepper industries in the 1920s and 
1930s
17
. Central characters such as John Howeson are described as calculating and 
manipulative individuals, responsible for false accounting and attempting to manipulate the 
market for tin for private financial gain. Any defence put forward by Howeson and others at 
the trial are not considered by the analyst, who effectively ‘ratifies’ the official version 
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produced by the judge at the trial. The events that took place in these business scandals (such 
as transfers of money, personal and political connections, investment decisions, secret deals, 
and so on), and the motives and vested interests underlying them, are treated as pre-existing 
social facts.  
Ethnomethodology adopts a different stance, known as ‘ethnomethodological indifference’. 
This does not mean being morally indifferent, but rather means remaining agnostic as regards 
to the adequacy or accuracy of members’ versions and explanations of social phenomenon. 
Where more than one version exists, or indeed where the social group being studied uses 
versions which differ from their own, the analyst does not regard any version as 
impoverished, incomplete or inaccurate. For example, in Cox’s analysis, Howeson’s defence 
that his financial statements were true and fair and his financial dealings were ‘honest trades’ 
would not be dismissed by the analyst, as Cox does. Nor would the judge’s verdict that 
Howeson was culpable of market manipulation and false accounting be ‘ratified’ by the 
analyst, as Cox also does. Rather, an ethnomethodological analysis would study what ethno-
methods were used within the trial - or indeed by analysts thereafter - to establish which of 
these two versions would become ‘social facts’, and with what consequences for the 
individuals and industries so involved.   
This does not make ethnomethodology an ethics-free or ‘idealist’ project. Analysts can, of 
course, have their own beliefs (e.g. about whether North was lying or Howeson was in fact 
heading up a cartel) and, moreover, their own ethical stance (e.g. about whether the arms 
dealing to Iran or price fixing in the pepper industry is morally defensible). The analyst can 
also be keenly interested in studying the inequalities, exploitation, power relations and 
sources of material gain that arise from the application of these ethno-methods. The focus is 
an epistemological question of how the social facts – the very facts that such material 
outcomes are founded on – are created: such as the social fact of whether Howeson is guilty 
of market manipulation or not. This involved two analytic steps. First, the analyst studies the 
methods through which members themselves handle issues associated with the veracity or 
reliability of versions – such as Howeson’s defence. Second, they study how members 
themselves deal with the existence of more than one version – such as the methods through 
which the courts decided on a single version of the truth when faced with competing 
‘evidence’ from different parties in Howeson’s trial18. Pollner puts it simply: don’t “argue” 







Another analytic avenue for making sense of historical evidence is to remain agnostic with 
regards to the competing versions of past events, such as the competing versions of North’s 
motives produced by Nields and North (versions (1) and (2) in Box 1), or the competing 
versions of Howeson’s business dealings in Cox’s analysis, and instead generate a ‘meta-
explanation’ founded on an understanding of the wider political economy. Here, the analyst 
asks: which set of vested interests, or political ideologies, were being played out here? Box 2 
illustrates how such explanations have been used in the case of the Iran-Contra affair 
analysed by Lynch and Bogen.  
 
---- Insert Box 2 here ---- 
 
Schneider and Woolgar call these kinds of methods of explanation provided in Box 2 
‘technologies for ironic revelation’:20 systems through which certain versions are revealed as 
untrue, and ‘hidden’ truths or causal explanations are instead revealed. Neo-Marxist and 
psychoanalytic explanations are two good examples: what people say is true is ‘revealed’ as 
untrue and instead the product of false consciousness (in the case of Marxist explanations) or 
repressed desire or fantasy (in the case of psychoanalytic explanations). Foucauldian 
geneaological approaches also tend to follow this logic: members’ versions are ‘revealed’ as 
products of normalisation by a power/knowledge regime, unbeknown to the people 
themselves
21
. The basic premise goes something like this: members do not really know what 
is going on and why things happen the way they do, but fortunately the professional social 
scientist does. The analytical (and, one could argue, ethical) implications of this method are 
profound: members’ versions are simply replaced with the (supposedly superior) versions of 
the analyst. 
Again, as members of society, ethnomethodologists can of course have their own 
explanations of what kinds of politics or vested interests act as “drivers” of history. In 
everyday life, apparently simple ‘ironicising’ reasoning procedures, such as the now 
infamous and well-used idiom from the ‘Profumo affair’, “He would say that, wouldn’t he”,22 
are powerful tools for discounting or dismissing versions as ‘false’. Ethnomethodology does 
not forbid historians, nor anyone for that matter, from using these kinds of reasoning 
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procedures in their own lives. However, they do not form part of an ethnomethodological 
analysis.   
As we highlighted above, ethnomethodology is not in the business of seeking to ‘improve’ 
members’ own first-order accounts and explanations with more ‘sophisticated’ or ‘complete’ 
second-order academic accounts and explanations, such as the theories, hypotheses and 
causal mechanisms envisaged by de Jong et. al.
23
 Rather, it is in the business of studying 
what methods the members of a setting use to produce, and settle on, their own explanations. 
In Cox’s analysis of the pepper scandal, this would involve examining the methods through 
which the judge established the verdict that Howeson was guilty of financial manipulation: a 
feature missing from Cox’s analysis.  
The methodological challenge for an ethnomethodological history is as follows: rather than 
producing the analyst’s version of ‘what happened’, the analyst studies how those involved in 
the historical events at the time, and those involved afterwards in “remembering” the past, 
handled questions of who or what should be credited as a reliable source to be ratified as the 
“truth”, and who should be discounted as fabricating, falsifying, bending, twisting, spinning, 
or manipulating events, for whatever reason (e.g. political ideologies, material interests, etc.). 
Lynch and Bogen put it thus: “we want to investigate how the parties to the testimony 
employed the distinction between truth and lying, and how they articulated the opposition 
between politics and value neutrality”.24  
 
What documents can tell us: The non-transparency of evidence and ‘applied 
deconstructionism’ 
Having touched on the way in which documents can be used to establish or contest histories 
and memories, specifically what the presence or absence of certain documents (e.g. absence-
from-shredding – see Box 1) can be used to ‘show’, we can now illustrate the value of a 
central ethnomethodological principle: that any piece of ‘evidence’ does not have a singular 
meaning but relies on interpretation as ‘indexing’ or ‘pointing’ to part of some ‘pattern’: a 
process known as the ‘documentary method of interpretation’. Box 3 shows how this applies 
not only to a document’s presence or absence (see Box 1) but also its content.   
 




In Cox’s analysis of the pepper scandal, the judge was also faced with a similar task: 
establishing whether certain documents – in this case financial statements and accounts – 
were false. Records of the transfer of funds between various parties were subject to the exact 
same interpretative work: did they indicate perfectly legal trades and transfers, or illegal 
activities of a price-fixing cartel? While Cox opts for the latter in his analysis, an 
ethnomethodological analysis invites us instead to ask how this judgement was made and 
what ‘documentary method of interpretation’ (see Box 3) was used in this process. This is not 
a trivial matter, nor is it simply ‘subjective judgement’: the methods of interpretation used by 
practical historians (such as in courtrooms or inquiries) and professional historians (such as 
academic scholars or museum curators) are methodical reasoning procedures, which also 
have profound material and social consequences. 
By not only highlighting but explicating the ‘non-transparency of evidence’, 
ethnomethodology offers one fruitful route through which business historians can 
operationalize Taylor, Bell and Cooke’s arguments based on Ricoeur that “the archive is 
socially constructed through the historiographical operation”25. However, while 
ethnomethodology may appear to share the ‘deconstructionist’ principles of post-modern and 
post-structural approaches to history,
26
 a crucial difference exists. Rather than attempting to 
‘de-construct’ texts or testimony to reveal the ideas, interests and ideologies that underpin it, 
ethnomethodology seeks to study the members’ own methods for de-constructing and re-
constructing texts and testimonies. In short, ethnomethodology is interested in studying the 
methods of ‘deconstructionists’ such as North or Howeson: 
 
“While it may seem perverse to call [North] and his allies “applied 
deconstructionists”, it is clear that ... [they] all worked doggedly (and with success) to 
problematize the committee’s treatment of particular documents as factual evidence. 
... Consequently, deconstruction does not identify our own methodological agenda, 
but it is instead a perspicuous feature of the struggle we describe.”27 
 
Ethnomethodology thereby offers potential for business historians as an empirical research 
programme that operationalizes Horwitz’s idea of the ‘non-transparency of evidence’, 
enabling us to study precisely how ‘documents’ are transformed into ‘reliable evidence’. As 
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such, ethnomethodology’s value lies in showing how “empirical evidence” - the very thing 
that de Jong, Higgins and Driel call for in order to ‘test’ hypotheses and build theories - is 
created from archival records.     
The work of Popp and Holt
28
 on the entrepreneurial activities of businessmen John Shaw and 
Henry Crane in the early 1800’s illustrates the interpretative work – or what Llewellyn and 
Hindmarsh
29
 call ‘inferential labour’ – brought to bear on historical archives to produce 
versions of the past. Popp and Holt provide two different readings of letters written by the 
businessmen, in order to illustrate the potential of their alternative processual analytic 
framework. Archives, therefore, do not simply ‘reveal’ the past to us. They rely on a variety 
of interpretative methods to assemble and establish credible versions of what happened and 
why: methods which are brought into the foreground of the analysis by an 
ethnomethodological history, not left as an un-explicated and hidden background analytic 
resource. However, in contrast to Popp and Holt, rather than attempting to ‘settle’ these kinds 
of debates about what happened by putting forward alternative explanations, 
ethnomethodology invites business history to study precisely how these debates are settled by 
examining how ‘candidate versions’ get transformed into ‘definitive facts’ about the past. 
The work of Popp and Holt, for instance, could be advanced by showing precisely how they 
drew conclusions about the motivations, aims, relationships and strategies of businessmen 
Shaw and Crane through inferences derived from what they term “close textual readings”.30  
The shared intellectual history of Popp and Holt’s phenomenological approach, given the 
influence of phenomenology on Garfinkel, also has implications for business history. The 
emphasis on understanding the ‘world view’31 of those historical actors we study is crucial: to 
understand the meanings, logics and reasoning of those actors rather than replace those 
‘emic’ views with the ‘etic’ logic of hypothetico-deductive positivism. Following Popp and 
Holt, the aim is to understand how historical actors themselves made sense at the time, rather 
than imposing post-hoc reasoning and assuming the classic linear trajectory of economic 
rationality. 
 
Sequencing, storytelling and social facts 
At a most fundamental level, business histories – like all histories - rely upon the creation of a 
chronology of facts about past events: what happened, when, why and to what effect. In the 
case of the Iran-Contra affair studied by Lynch and Bogen, a series of ‘bare facts’ were 
12 
 
assembled by the official report: facts about who did what and when, when missiles were 
moved and where, what transfers of funds took place, and so on. Box 4 shows the 
significance of which events are included, and how events these are sequenced, for the types 
of historical stories which can be told.  
 
--- Insert Box 4 here --- 
 
The point of the comparison of chronologies in Box 4 is thus: to show how the apparently 
‘trivial’ details such as which dates and actors are included, in which order, and what forms 
of knowledge and intention are imputed, are loaded with assumptions and inferences about 
the events and those involved. As Hansen rightly points out, chronologies of ‘facts’ only 
make sense when given a certain ‘plot structure’ of who did what, when and why32. 
Ethnomethodology therefore offers a way of empirically operationalizing Hayden White’s 
work on the stylistics of historical narratives: 
 
“... history consists of the provisions of a plot structure for a sequence of events so 
that their nature as a comprehensible process is revealed by their figuration as a story 
of a particular kind.” 
 
Historians therefore work by collecting together records, sequencing them and judging them 
(e.g. as factual or fictional), with a view to their inclusion in a developing narrative. The job 
of the ethnomethodological historian, then, is not to decide on the most compelling narrative, 
or to produce their own narrative, or to avoid the ‘pitfall’ of the fiction-genre by producing a 
more ‘objective’ account. Rather, it is to study how chronologies are pieced together into a 
meaningful and coherent narrative, how certain chronologies are ratified as ‘factual’, and how 
others are written off as ‘speculation’, ‘spin’ or ‘spoof’. As such, ethnomethodology 
contributes to the questions laid out by Hansen concerning how certain narratives come to 
dominate and how the sensemaking process stabilizes around certain versions of events
33
. 




“... the fact that the historian or sociologist faces a daunting task when trying to use 
documentary collections to reconstruct systematic and coherent temporal or 
organizational patterns, becomes less interesting than the constitutive work of 
assembling documentary materials into coherent historical accounts.”34 
 
Business histories, such as the analysis of the pepper scandal produced by Cox
35
, also rely on 
the production of chronologies of events involving the movement of people, money, 
information, and so on. For example, Cox highlights the significance of knowledge of a 
Treasury letter being made available the day before the scheduled sale of the Boots Pure 
Drug Company, to which he attributes the subsequent U-turn and back-pedalling of the 
Treasury’s authorisation of the deal. Which actors knew what, and on what date, was central 
to Cox’s construction of a compelling story of the pepper scandal. Apparently trivial 
differences in what events are linked, and in what order, are far from trivial in terms of the 
historical narrative constructed. An altogether different story could have been told if the 
supposed U-turn had been presented as an outcome of the Treasury’s (‘rational economic’) 
assessment of the financial risk of the deal. A different story again could be written if 
political motives had also been excluded from the story: as in Cox’s reference to the 
Treasury’s desire to avoid political “embarrassment”, given their concern about the political 
implications of the deal in relation to the mounting war debt
36
. The point is not that Cox is 
wrong to sequence events in that way, or attribute events to particular personal, political or 
financial motives. The aim is not to produce a different sequence, or supplant this explanation 
with a different set of motives and causal mechanisms. The aim of an ethnomethodological 
history is to enrich our understanding of how the social facts used by Cox to produce his 
explanation were produced.  
A final note is relevant here. Analysing which version is believed and which version prevails 
does not mean that the historian is expected to ‘get inside the minds’ of those tasked with 
assembling official histories. Nor are historians asked to judge whether they themselves trust 
the accounts of people like North (in Lynch and Bogen’s analysis) or Howeson (in Cox’s 
analysis). Ethnomethodology does not seek to speculate about private cognitive processes; it 
studies inter-subjective and observable social processes. This is different to the analytic path 
taken by mainstream history, in which motivations and intentions are used to perform 
interpretative work, such as when Cox describes actors at the Treasury as ultimately 
“concerned” about war debt repayments, or describes the Chancellor of the Exchequer as 
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only “reluctantly” accepting advice to prioritise avoiding a devaluation of sterling37. Rather, 
an ethnomethodological analysis would enable us to analyse how accounts produced by 
members containing what C. Wright Mills called ‘vocabularies of motive’38 (e.g. having a 
“concern”, doing something “reluctantly”) are consequential for the events being played out.  
This emphasis on members’ ‘public’ accounts of motives and intentions is justified as 
follows: (a) these public accounts are all that members at the time had available to them, (b) 
these accounts are what informed their actions and decisions at the time (because they also 
cannot read other people’s minds), (c) hence, these accounts are constitutive of - and 
consequential for - the unfolding history-in-action. Many sources are available for doing 
exactly this kind of analysis: back-room meetings to edit official reports or corporate 
documents, debates about who should have authorship rights, procedures for resolving 
different versions, decisions about what press statements should be released and when, what 
evidence should be ‘made public’  and which should be withheld as ‘classified’: all of these 
interactions would present rich opportunities (access permitting) for studying the ethno-
methods of practical historians.  
 
An Ethnomethodological Research Agenda 
What, then, does adopting an ethnomethodological approach to business history offer to the 
field? In this section, we outline a future research agenda for business history that addresses 
three research questions: how archives and records are compiled; how versions of the past are 
assembled; and how historians can learn from explicating their own historical ethno-methods. 
 
1. Archives and records 
Ethnomethodology treats any collection of records, however disparate, accidental or 
deliberately assembled, as products of the ethno-methods of the social groups who created 
and subsequently collected, organized and used them. This opens up some interesting 
avenues for business history. Two key insights and research directions will be considered 
here: studying members’ ethno-methods for categorising, classifying and recording; and 
studying the meaning of the presence or absence of records themselves.  
First, a fruitful line of research can be directed to studying members’ practices for creating 
records. It is a well-established idea that archives do not tell us what went on in the past; 
15 
 
rather, they tell us what that social group in question deemed suitable for recording (and what 
to omit from the record) and in what format, for what audience, and so on
39
. Records of wars, 
laws and taxes were collected by sovereigns and governments because that is what was 
deemed necessary and useful to record: other things were deemed ‘trivial’ or lost forever 
because no records were kept. Other documents which did exist – particularly ones that were 
thought to threaten the preferred world-view of those in power in particular – are destroyed or 
edited. Some are copied and shared widely, others are kept hidden away.  
The crucial question for historians who want to understand the meaning of archives, then, is 
to understand how this record-making, record-keeping, record-destroying, record-editing and 
record-sharing was undertaken. Ethnomethodology is therefore useful for understanding the 
methods through which members of a social group – such as a company, an industry or a 
government department – decide what is recorded, and how, why, when and by whom. 
Garfinkel’s study of record-keeping practices in a clinic shows that records should not be 
seen as simply records of things that happened, but rather indications of the kinds of things 
their authors and users need them for, such as making (and sharing) inferences and 
decisions.
40
 As a result, there may be ‘good’ organizational reasons for apparently ‘bad’ 
records.  
In business, for instance, records of meetings are obviously not mere reflections of what was 
said, either because certain discussions are excluded from the minutes or because an arbiter 
decides on what ought to be recorded. Hence, business historians can benefit from 
understanding members’ ethno-methods for deciding what is put in the official records or 
minutes (and what is ‘off the record’), and how those records are shared and used 
subsequently. Organizations also actively ‘create the past’ by using records, such as corporate 
images, strategy documents or minutes of previous meetings.
41
 The ethno-methods for 
studying the ‘fossilization’ of certain accounts into the organizational ‘memory’ would 
therefore also be a fruitful target for inquiry. 
Meehan’s ethnomethodological study of record-keeping practices by police officers showed 
that officers deliberately shared some records with other agencies, but deliberately withheld 
others, again for ‘good organizational reasons’.42 Some information contained in records was 
also deliberately designed to make it useless or unintelligible to outsiders, such as in court. 
Moreover, the recording and categorisation of certain charges – required for official statistics 
of different types of crime to be generated - was also manipulated in order to maintain 
relationships with particular sections of the community, improve relationships with other 
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government agencies, or increase the likelihood of prosecution. Understanding what records 
can tell us therefore requires an understanding of the meanings and purposes of those who 
created them: precisely what an ethnomethodological history seeks to uncover through 
understanding the reasoning procedures of the social group in question.   
As Meehan’s study shows us, numerical records are no different to written records, making 
ethnomethodology  valuable for ‘opening the black box’ of numerical records such as 
accounting calculations or official statistics: the focus of histories by scholars such as 
Ezzamel, Harrison and Lampland
43
. In fact, some of Garfinkel’s key insights arise from his 
studies of how numbers such as official statistics are generated
44
 - a research programme now 
advanced by the field of study known as ‘ethno-statistics’.45 The value of an 
ethnomethodological history, then, lies in studying the ethno-methods through which ‘official 
records’ – whether written or numerical – are constructed. 
  
2. Assembling the past: practical procedures 
The task of the professional historian, as we noted above, is to piece together historical events 
through whatever records are at hand. However, other actors and groups are also ‘practical 
historians’: inquiry committees, lawyers, judges and juries, police officers, doctors, social 
workers, journalists, authors of biographies and auto-biographies, lay storytellers, and so on. 
These actors have their own distinct ethno-methods for assembling histories of past events 
from memories, artefacts, oral traditions and written records, and also their own distinct 
practical purposes and goals. Two future research agendas will be discussed here 
simultaneously: studying how versions of the past are assembled from diverse records; and 
studying the practical tasks and decisions for which those histories are used.  
Ethnomethodological studies of the criminal justice system – including the work of police 
officers, coroners, lawyers, judges and juries
46
 – are particularly illuminating for historians 
because these professionals also routinely deal with records of past events and have to – by 
necessity – assemble them into a meaningful version (account) of what happened and why. 
One of the key challenges faced by judges and historians alike is how to handle competing 
versions of the same past event. Pollner’s study of traffic court judges offers a particularly 
rich theoretical resource.
47
 Pollner examined the ‘reasoning procedures’ of judges dealing 
with competing accounts (what he called ‘reality disjunctures’) in written records and 
testimonies, between, say, defendant and police officer, or defendant and witness. Significant 
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judicial decisions – to convict or to acquit – rested upon the reasoning procedures judges used 
to assess who is lying and who is telling the truth, which records are accurate and reliable, 
and which fragments from the scene constitute sufficient ‘evidence’ to support one particular 
version. In the same way, governmental committees and inquiries, such as the Iran-Contra 
inquiry studied by Lynch and Bogen or the Danish Banking Committee studied by Hansen
48
, 
also rely on a set of reasoning procedures for deciding what constitutes reliable and credible 
testimony, memory, records and evidence, in addition to methods for selecting between 
competing versions. Decisions not only about the fate of individuals but also entire industries 
– in the case of parliamentary inquiries into the banking crisis, for instance – rest upon the 
use of these reasoning procedures, making them important sites for business historians to 
study ‘history-in-the-making’.  
Harrison’s analysis of false accounting in the Soviet Union in the 1940s to 1960s offers a 
good case in point.
49
 Soviet courts and party investigation committees clearly employed a 
range of ethno-methods to establish where false accounting has taken place in the production 
quotas and plans submitted by factory or farm directors. Yet we do not know, from 
Harrison’s analysis, what these methods were. Ethnomethodology therefore invites us to push 
Harrison’s analysis further: how did these courts and committees decide which of the many 
reported cases to investigate? How did they distinguish between ‘petty’ fraud and ‘marginal’ 
tinkering and more serious false accounting? How did they establish whether multiple 
consistent accounts were evidence of corroboration of facts, or collusion, concealment, 
bribery or intimidation? Addressing these questions would lead to significant insights into 
how historical events play out, including pivotal moments of business success and failure. 
The case of the apparently ‘falsified’ prospectus produced to entice investment by Lord 
Kylsant, director of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company in the 1930s, shows how records 
and accounts treated as ‘accurate’ can be later deemed ‘false’.50 This transformation of social 
facts had consequences not only for the individuals involved (Kyslant was in fact jailed for 
misreporting) and the organization (the company was soon liquidated) but also wider 
reaching consequences for the whole business community (changes to the regulation and 
auditing of business in the UK later ensued). The ethno-methods used for interpreting 
documents such as accounts are therefore not a matter of ‘subjective’ or ‘idiosyncratic’ 
introspection, but rather constitute methodical and consequential procedures for establishing 
the ‘facts of the matter’.  
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The insights from ethnomethodology reside not only in how individual records are made 
sense of by various social groups, but crucially how collections of records are made 
meaningful through the use of the ‘documentary method of interpretation’ discussed earlier. 
This concept refers to the way interpretations are made of individual ‘instances’ – such as a 
single account or record – by viewing it as ‘indexing’ or ‘pointing to’ a wider ‘pattern’ (see 
Box 3). The method is important because the same ‘instance’ (e.g. a record) can be made 
sense of in different ways by interpreting it as an instance of a different ‘pattern’. What this 
means for business history is that historical records therefore do not ‘contain’ their meaning; 
their meaning is generated through their interpretation as part of some ‘pattern’, a point that 
links to Horwitz’s idea of the ‘non-transparency of evidence’ discussed earlier.  
An ethnomethodological history invites us to pose two simple but powerful questions: what 
documentary method is used by various ‘practical historians’ when assembling ‘patterns’ that 
connect past events? And, most importantly, what difference does the method thus used make 




 show how judges and 
police officers used the documentary method of interpretation in decisions about young 
offenders. The self-same evidence – such as a knife found in the defendant’s pocket by the 
arresting officer – could be used by the prosecution to put forward one ‘pattern’ (e.g. 
intentional act of criminality), and by the defence to put forward an alternative ‘pattern’ (e.g. 
what all gang members do). Significant material outcomes flowed from which ‘pattern’ was 
used: kids were either locked up, sent to a psychiatrist or let off with a caution.  
Box 3 showed how Oliver North challenged the ‘pattern’ used by the Iran-Contra committee 
members to make sense of historical records (namely, that certain documents ‘proved’ his 
involvement in key events), and attempted to supplant it with his version of the ‘correct 
pattern’ through which to interpret that same ‘evidence’. Significant material outcomes also 
flowed from this historical ‘pattern-making’: North was not prosecuted for his role in the 
events (and was instead transformed by some into a ‘national hero’), ambiguities about ‘what 
really happened’ remained, and the President was largely unscathed by the scandal. 
Ethnomethodology thereby directs attention to a new set of questions: not which pattern is 
‘correct’ and should be used by the historian to piece together the evidence themselves, but 
rather which patterns were used by the members of the social group themselves: and with 




3. Reflective practice and the explication of ethno-methods 
One of the most basic questions for a historian looking at a historical record is ‘what does this 
record mean?’, or more specifically ‘what can it tell us about the people, events or time in 
which it was created?’ Ethnomethodology directs us to understanding meanings-in-situ: what 
the document meant, and was used for, by the people who create and use it. Interpretations of 
‘what a record tells us’ must be grounded in this understanding of what the record meant for 
members (and was used for) at the time, not a retrospective reconstruction or rationalisation. 
While historians cannot ‘go back in time’ to study the people who create and use them, they 
nonetheless have to make certain assumptions about what the record ‘means’ in order to piece 
together a meaningful version of history.  
The crucial element for a more reflective
53
 business history is the explication of these usually 
hidden assumptions, or ‘reasoning procedures’. Two illustrative examples may be useful 
here. Ethnomethodological studies of doctors
54
 have shown that medical records ‘make 
sense’ not through the inscriptions themselves (words, symbols, numbers, etc.). Rather, it is 
their sequential placement down or across the page (i.e. in the sequence ‘patient presentation 
of symptom’ – ‘medical diagnosis’ – ‘prescription/recommendation’), that gives them their 
meaning. Indeed, the same words, but in a different sequential order, mean something very 
different. Apparently innocuous and meaningless elements within the records, such as 
quotation marks, means something very different to doctors: rather than quoted speech, it 
denotes a medical judgement of diagnostic scepticism towards what the patient has reported.  
Meehan’s study, discussed above, illustrates another crucial point55. Meehan showed how 
police officers used unofficial ‘running records’ to make sense of the appropriate actions for 
dealing with ‘juvenile offenders’. These records were not ‘officially’ supposed to be used, 
and were only ‘decipherable’ by those knowledgeable in the police sub-culture and language, 
but were nonetheless regarded by officers as an authoritative source of information for 
making decisions – such as whether an arrested youth should be released without charge, 
cautioned or prosecuted.  
Historians examining archives of these kinds of police records and medical records could 
easily ‘miss’ the practical meaning of such records that they had for their creators, and ‘read 
in’ a different meaning altogether. Medical records could be taken as a random series of 
medical notes, not a meaningful sequence in which it was the sequential placement, not the 
words themselves, which mattered most. Quotation marks could be understood as simply 
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reports of what a patient said, not a display of professional scepticism. Similarly, a historian 
faced with the apparently ‘meaningless’ and ‘unofficial’ notes shared between police officers 
could easily put them to one side, and focus instead on the apparently more ‘important’ and 
‘official’ records in each file. Hence, the reasoning procedures of the historian – how they 
reasoned which records were most ‘reliable’ (in the police officer’s case), and what the 
record ‘means’ and ‘tells us’ (in the doctor’s case) – need to be made explicit for others in the 
field to know (or perhaps even challenge) the ‘readings’ made by the researcher.   
Our discussion of Lynch and Bogen’s study has also showed us that it is not only the content 
of records that are used by historians (‘professional’ or ‘practical’) to assemble histories; it is 
also their very presence or absence. The absence of records that the Iran-Contra investigators 
expected to find was also subject to different ‘patterns’: was the absence of records to 
indicate a pattern of deliberate acts of shredding to avoid culpability, a pattern of routine and 
legitimate shredding, a pattern of poor recall, or a pattern of no such document existing in the 
first place (see Box 1)? These are central questions for historians: what can the presence or 
absence of an object or record ‘show’? This question is all the more pertinent when the 
archives that business historians use are partial or fragmented. The threat to valuable archives 
posed by events such as the potential private sale of the collections of the Wedgewood 
Museum and the proposed takeover of EMI Music are very real. Should these archives be 
split up, destroyed or distributed across various private collectors, business historians trying 
to piece together the story of these important companies would face a difficult task without 
the records and objects being kept together, to enable a ‘pattern’ to be discerned from seeing 
them in their original context.   
Ethnomethodology shows that establishing a ‘pattern’ relies on interpretative procedures for 
deciding what the presence or absence of an object or document tells us about historical 
events. Zimmerman’s56 ethnomethodological study of a public welfare agency showed how 
welfare application assessors did not always view the absence of a record (such as a record of 
a job application being made) as evidence that an event did not take place. Nor did they 
always view the presence of a record (such as a written record of a job application) as 
evidence that an event did take place: their reasoning procedures of ‘professional scepticism’ 
led them on occasion to question whether documents had been falsified. And all for another 
practical and highly consequential task: distributing scarce funds to ‘legitimate’ rather than 
‘dishonest’ claimants.  
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What does this mean for the development of a more reflective business history? 
Ethnomethodology directs us towards explicating the often hidden or taken-for-granted 
ethno-methods through which business historians, faced with an archive of records and 
evidence, decides what the presence or absence of certain pieces means. Only by knowing 
what procedures the historian used to make sense of the absence of a record (e.g. as evidence 
that the record was accidentally misplaced, deliberately removed or never created in the first 
place) can other scholars in the field have the opportunity to put forward alternative 
‘readings’ of the same absence. These insights can also be used to inform pedagogy, to teach 
students of business history the methods through which histories are produced. 
Letting go of the idea of a single, definitive and objective “truth”, and following Hayden 
White in viewing history as a ‘narrative’57, does not mean that ‘anything goes’ and any 
version of the past can, or should, be supported by the academic field. As ethnomethodology 
has shown, all social groups have their own more or less institutionalised procedures for 
deciding a version is to be treated as ‘good enough for all practical purposes’ and when to 
stop the process of deconstruction because it is time to ‘settle’ upon a version (or set of 
versions). This process could be enabled, we propose, by taking the often hidden and private 
reasoning procedures of business historians and making them public for other scholars to see 
and reflect upon. In contrast to Popp and Holt’s idea that the intentions, thought-processes, 
motivations, strategies and objectives of actors can be “inferred through close textual 
readings”,58 we propose that business history can instead benefit from revealing how its 
scholars made those ‘readings’ in the first place. In short, what Lynch and Bogen have done 
for the ‘practical historians’ of the Iran-Contra committee, we propose can also be done for 
the ‘professional historians’ of the field of business history.  
  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a research agenda for business history that is 
informed by ethnomethodology’s ‘re-specification’ of sociology as a “science”, in light of the 
plea by de Jong, Higgins and Driel to develop business history as a positive science 
underpinned by objective evidence-based theory development.
59
 Ethnomethodology rejects 
the idea of studying society using the positivistic methods of natural science in favour of 
studying the underlying practical methods through which social facts are produced. For the 
field of business history, ethnomethodology directs us to studying the methods through which 
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‘histories’ are produced through the organization of diverse sources of evidence and inference 
about past events.
60
 As such, this paper contributes to a wider body of work that seeks to 
move away from objectivist and empiricist approaches towards a social constructionist 
agenda that recognises the ‘epistemological work’ involved in the crafting of histories and 
sensemaking about the past.
61
  
In what follows, we will conclude by discussing how an ethnomethodological history can be 
taken forward in three ways: (a) as an empirical programme of research, (b) as a source of 
theory development, and (c) as a methodological resource for engaging in reflective practice. 
As an empirical programme of research, ethnomethodological history invites empirical 
investigation into how, and to what practical purposes, history is produced and used by 
different actors in different settings. Recent work on the genre of corporate history in written 
texts
62
 , interview-based studies of corporate historians
63
 and ethnographic investigations of 
the use of history during periods of organizational change
64
 illustrate how “history-in-action” 
could be studied empirically.  Recent theoretical work on the role of history in institutional 
theory
65
, and the notion of corporate history as a strategic resource
66
, also provide fertile 
ground for theoretical connection with our argument here, particularly in relation to the 
argument that history is a “malleable construct”67 that is both a medium and outcome of 
interpretative processes.  
Ethnomethodology has informed some important theoretical advancements in business 
history already, even though it is rarely mentioned, through its intellectual influence on the 
field of science and technology studies, actor-network theory and performativity
68
, 
strategizing and strategic sensemaking
69
 and the study of accounting and accountability
70
. 
This literature has opened up the ‘black box’ of accounting, management and business to 
study how ‘facts’ of various kinds are assembled. Just as MacKensie seeks to develop 
‘ethnoaccountancy’ to study the methods through which financial markets and accountancy 
calculations are assembled
71
, our aim here is to invite business historians to develop an 
ethnomethodological approach which studies how business histories are assembled. 
Following Deidre Boden’s contribution to organization studies and her approach to studying 
‘organization-in-action’72, we propose that a core contribution to business history can be 
made through explicating the practical actions (ethno-methods) through which versions of 
past events are worked up, worked on and eventually ‘settled’. As ethnomethodology 
involves the study of how people “make sense” through the methodical deployment of 
‘reasoning procedures’, the ethnomethodological history we propose here thereby offers a 
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complementary (but distinct) framework which advances existing approaches to studying 
historical sensemaking founded in the social psychology of scholars such as Weick and the 
narrative approach of scholars such as White.
73
 That said, much potential also exists for 
cross-fertilisation between these distinct approaches. Another fruitful avenue for future work 
lies at the interface between ethnomethodology and discourse analysis, to study how talk and 
text are employed in processes of meaning-making and practical reasoning.
74
  
What kinds of research methodology are appropriate for the ethnomethodological agenda we 
are advocating here? Ethnomethodology is not a research ‘method’ within sociology, akin to, 
say, using interviews or examining documents. However, it does have clear preferences for 
certain types of methods and certain types of data. Given its aim to recover and reveal the 
ethno-methods used in a particular setting, ethnomethodology has a strong preference for 
naturalistic data (that is, data collected from events and settings which would have occurred 
without the researcher being there), coupled with close observation of the setting, through 
ethnomethodologically-informed ethnography
75
 and/or records of real-time interaction using 
audio- or video-recording. These methods are particularly useful for studying the work of 
‘strategic historians’ of various kinds, such as senior managers who seek to remember, forget, 
invoke or suppress memories of the past strategically - to legitimate particular courses of 
action
76
, or corporate historians who create versions of the past strategically - to sell products, 
manage the corporation’s public image or to motivate employees77.   
Ethnomethodology rejects, and seeks to “re-specify”, not only the kind of quantitative 
positivistic variables-and-outcomes types of methodology, based on sampling techniques and 
correlations between statistics of various kinds, as advocated by de Jong, Higgins and Driel, 
but also many forms of qualitative enquiry aimed at uncovering ‘meanings’ embedded in 
letters, diaries, artefacts and documents. By “re-specify” what is meant is to take the second-
order constructs generated by social scientists – which purport to ‘improve’ the theories that 
members themselves use by making them more sophisticated, more scientific or more 
complete – and replace them with a careful and detailed study of the first-order ‘theories-in-
use’ that members themselves use to accomplish what they are doing. The reason is simple 
but powerful: if the theories produced by social scientists (e.g. Marxist theory, 
psychoanalysis, Foucauldian genealogy, post-colonial theory, and so on) are not the ones that 
members use, then they are not constitutive of, and consequential for, the setting itself. 
Hence, an ethnomethodological history invites us to the theories-in-use deployed by historical 
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actors – their assumptions about what exists in the world, and how various elements relate to 
one another – because it is these that make up the very phenomena we seek to study.  
Pollner calls for a ‘non-ironic’ sociology78 which seeks to treat members’ own accounts, 
reasoning and explanations in their own right, and on their own terms, without ‘ironicising’ 
them as somehow limited, incomplete or inadequate when compared to the ‘complete’, 
‘objective’ and ‘sophisticated’ versions produced by professional social scientists – of the 
kind advocated by de Jong, Higgins and Driel. In the case of an ethnomethodological history, 
this means studying the accounts, reasoning procedures and explanations of historical actors 
in their own terms, as they produced them and as handled by them, rather than seeking to 
‘replace’ them with the historians own version of what happened and why. For example, 
rather than seeking to identify the underlying motives, allegiances and interests of various 
actors involved in a significant historical event, an ethnomethodological history would study 
the accounts and explanations about their motives, allegiances and interests produced during 
the course of events themselves, as present in various sources (e.g. company statements or 
reports, autobiographies, journalistic reports, political debates, witness interviews, etc.). 
Moreover, as we have argued, ethnomethodology can also be ‘turned on ourselves’ to study 
the methods that we, as professional business historians, use to make official histories. As 
such, ethnomethodology invites a more reflective form of inquiry which reveals precisely 
how the business histories we produce were produced: not with a view to ‘conceding’ the 
influence of our own interpretive procedures in order to overcome the influence of 
‘subjectivity’ and in so doing develop a more ‘objective’ historical science, but rather with a 
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Box 1. Making Sense of Historical Evidence: The Case of the Iran-Contra Affair. 
What does doing ethnomethodological history involve? And what insights can it bring to the field of business 
history? Lynch and Bogen’s book The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text and Memory at the Iran-Contra Affair 
offers an exemplary case study of the practices and procedures (ethno-methods) of the interrogators and 
witnesses at the hearings of the Joint House-Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaragua Opposition held in 1987. The historical import of the Iran-Contra affair is not in doubt: it 
threatened to bring down the President of the United States, and was a televised ‘spectacle’ of interrogation 
involving not only the witnesses and ‘accused’ but also the entire organizational system of security and 
surveillance and the political and military apparatus of the whole country.  
The ethnomethodological approach of Lynch and Bogen studies the methods through which oral testimony and 
written documents were solicited, located, verified, interpreted, challenged, certified, rejected and stabilized by 
the parties involved. Rather than attempt to produce their own version of what happened and why, as most 
conventional historians do, the authors instead examine the ethno-methods of the ‘practical historians’: the 
politicians who served as members of the bi-partisan Select Committee charged with the task of producing a 
final, definite version of “what happened”. Understanding these ethno-methods is important because it was this 
‘definitive’ version which was subsequently taken up in the history books as the history of the affair. Thus, from 
learning about the methods used by these ‘interrogators’, we can learn much about the work of business 
historians who are charged with the task of producing histories of business organizations and systems.  
Like all professional historians, the committee’s challenge was not only to make sense of the documents 
retrieved, but also what the absence of certain documents they would have expected to find reveals about the 
events in question. Piecing together a history involves not only compiling a chronology of key events and key 
actors, but also some form of explanation or meaningful narratives about who did what, and why. For example, 
two different versions were put forward to explain the absence of certain key documents by committee counsel 
John Nields and Oliver North, the White House National Security Council (NSC) staff member implicated in the 
scandal. According to Nields, the absent documents were shredded the day before the investigators’ raid in a 
deliberate criminal act of evidence concealment. According to North, however, no such conspiracy took place, 
and shredding was undertaken as a routine matter and on a daily basis, and for legitimate motives: namely, 
protecting the interests of the country and its overseas agents. North also goes on to attribute a set of motives to 
his interrogators by accusing Nields and the whole committee of conducting a political “show-trial” designed to 
undermine the Republican party, create a convenient scapegoat, and put the security of the United States at risk. 
In short, two versions of politics are in competition here:  
(1) Nields version: North is lying about his knowledge of shredding the documents to protect himself 
(personal motive e.g. avoiding a jail-term) and/or others (party-political allegiances e.g. protecting 
the Republican party). 
(2) North version: He is not lying; he cannot remember shredding because he shredded daily and 
routinely and for good reasons, and the interrogation itself is part of a political conspiracy to 
undermine public confidence in the President.   
An ethnomethodological history would study ethno-methods used by the various parties involved to establish a 
single definitive ‘social fact’ about key events such as this. An ethnomethodological history would ask: how do 
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some versions get discredited and others get credited with the status of ‘facts’? This task is not only of scholarly 
import but of very practical import, because it was not only the moral standing of the characters written into the 
history books which was at stake here, but also a possible impeachment of the President or a prison sentence for 
North. Hence, an ethnomethodological history is also able to trace the material consequences of the social facts 
produced by ‘practical historians’, including its effects at the level of individuals, groups, institutions and even 





Box 2. Making Sense of Historical Evidence: Ironicising and Meta-Explanations. 
What meta-explanations could be provided by historians to explain the events of the Iran-Contra affair analysed 
by Lynch and Bogen? Many avenues are available to historians using this explanatory path. Nields could be 
portrayed as secretly allied to a Democratic campaign to oust the Republican President (Reagan), using his 
questioning to undermine faith in the current government and prove a ‘conspiracy’ to protect the presidency 
from association with illegal acts. North could also be presented as a pawn in a Republican mission to covertly 
approve covert arms sales, evidence of their all-too-close relationship with big business and private arms 
companies and their anti-communist campaign to overthrow ‘unfavourable’ regimes. This avenue may not 
involve ‘taking sides’ or ‘arguing with the members’ explicitly, rather it supplants members’ versions with the 
historian’s preferred explanation of who did what and why. Written records and reports, as well as oral 
testimony, can also be interpreted and ‘explained’ this way. Compare, for example, this apparently trivial but 
important difference in these two descriptions of a historical report: 
“The Congress report of 1987” 
“The Democratically-controlled Congress report”79  
The latter does what Pollner calls an ‘ironicising’ of the account contained within the document, by claiming 
that the account should not be taken as a literal, faithful, neutral or reliable reflection of what really happened, 
but rather treated ‘ironically’ as a politically-laden and biased account. (The ironicising premise being that 
Democrats had a vested interest in undermining and ousting the Republican President, Reagan, making their 




Box 3. What can documents tell us about historical events? Indexicality and the documentary method of 
interpretation. 
What can an ethnomethodological history tell us about how historical documents are interpreted and 
transformed into social facts? Lynch and Bogen’s analysis reveals the ethno-methods used to scrutinise 
documents in the Iran-Contra affair, such as internal memos and communications, in order to establish stable 
social facts about what happened. The committee faced a practical challenge: to decide which documents were 
to be treated as evidence of actual events that happened and which were ‘faked’ or ‘planted’, for reasons such as  
providing a ‘decoy’ and ‘false lead’ during covert military operations, or avoiding ‘giving the game away’ if 
classified documents should be leaked to ‘enemy states’. Each document was methodically scrutinised, and 
witnesses interrogated, to assess its ‘authenticity’. Once this process was underway, and certain documents were 
ratified as not-faked, or not-deliberately-misleading, these would then be used to ratify future documents 
through cross-referencing of dates, locations and persons, in an on-going process of ‘working up’ the facts-of-
the-matter. 
For example, when presented with documents that stated he had authorised certain transactions, North produced 
an alternative ‘reading’ by claiming they were fakes designed to enable ‘plausible deniability’: the deliberate 
crafting of documents to enable officials such as the President to ‘plausibly deny’ knowledge of certain 
questionable (and possibly impeachable) activities. North used the ‘plausible deniability’ method to great effect, 
leaving much ambiguity and uncertainty about whether the supposedly ‘cast iron’ evidence of events was even 
evidence that those events had in fact taken place. Like the ‘ironicising’ that social scientists and historians often 
undertake when faced with versions produced by members, North also applied this same ‘reasoning procedure’ 
here by claiming that documents do not ‘literally’ describe events that took place and actually conceal the real 
events, and thus should be treated ‘ironically’: 
“... witnesses can further destabilize the documentary record by formulating the possibility that the 
evidentiary documents at the interrogator’s disposal were left behind under the auspices of a hidden 
ironic design. The suggestion that “original” documents may have been designed ironically furnishes 
what is at best an equivocal archive that, when uncharitable interpretations are raised, can readily be 
denied by suggesting alternative readings of the same evidence.” 
Interpreting what a document ‘tells us’ thereby relies upon a version of the circumstances of its production: who 
produced it, for what purpose, with what future scenarios in mind, and so on. The ethnomethodological concepts 
of ‘indexicality’ and the ‘documentary method of interpretation’ are particularly valuable for studying the 
production of history: through the production of alternative versions of these “contexts” or “circumstances of 






Box 4. Emplotment, fact sequencing and historical storytelling 
Lynch and Bogen analyse how histories of the Iran-Contra affair vary in apparently minor but significant ways 
in their chronologies of ‘basic facts’;80 which dates and events were significant enough to be included, the 
sequential placement of events (what followed what), the naming of certain organizations or individuals 
involved, details of which decisions were attributed to which actor, and so on. Even the actors themselves, not 
only the historians piecing together the story after-the-fact, took a great interest in the details of the chronology 
being assembled. North, for example, is reported to have insisted that an initial CIA document that contained the 
phrase “We in the CIA ... [did not know that Hawk missiles had been shipped to Iran]” was changed to “No-one 
in the U.S. Government ...”: enabling the NSC (the organization he worked for at the time) to ‘plausibly deny’ 
knowledge of the activity.  
An illustration may be useful here. Compare the following accounts, which could all more-or-less plausibly 
have been written about the “shredding affair” discussed in Box 1:  
“The investigators visited NSC head-office on 
21
st
 November 1986 to collect documentary 
evidence.” 
No implication of criminality or culpability. 
“North shredded a series of important documents 
on 20
th
 November, the day before the 
investigators arrived on 21
st
 November.” 
Implication of criminality or culpability attached to 
a single individual 
“Documents were shredded before the 
investigators arrived.”  
Agent/agency responsible for shredding is 
omitted,
81
 diffusing or removing culpability. 
“Certain documents the committee expected to 
recover could not be located during the 
investigation.” 
Intentional destruction through shredding not 
mentioned, leaving open the possibility of being 
lost, stolen, or never in existence in the first place. 
“The President ordered the shredding of the 
documents in a secret meeting with NSC staff.” 
Naming of individual – President - implicated as 
responsible, but whole organization NSC rather 
than North personally also culpable. 
“The President’s advisors approved the NSC’s 
shredding of the documents.” 
Culpability of President left ambiguous – dependent 
on further interpretation of President’s personal 
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